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Intellectual Property
by Michael W. Rafter*
Previous issues of the Eleventh Circuit Survey have not included
articles addressing developments in the Eleventh Circuit's intellectual
property jurisprudence. But as the Internet and other forms of media
make an ever-increasing amount of information available to anyone
anywhere, intellectual property rights are becoming increasingly
significant and valuable. Therefore, no better time exists than now to
add an intellectual property article to the Survey. Accordingly, this
Article examines several noteworthy cases involving intellectual property
rights decided by the Eleventh Circuit during 1999.
I.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE ANTIBOOTLEGGING
STATUTE

Perhaps one of the most interesting cases decided by the Eleventh
Circuit in 1999 was United States v. Moghadam.1 Moghadam involved
the nation's first constitutional challenge to the quasi-copyright
protections afforded musicians under 18 U.S.C. § 2319A,2 which, along
with 17 U.S.C. § 1101,' is commonly known as the Antibootlegging
Statute. 4 This statute, enacted as part of the Uruguay Round Agree* Associate in the firm of Kilpatrick Stockton LLP, member of the Intellectual Property
Section, Atlanta, Georgia. Mercer University (B.A., summa cum laude, 1992); Mercer
University School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1995). Member, Mercer Law Review (19931995). The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance and comments provided by
Theodore H. Davis, Jr. and Joseph M. Beck, partners in the firm of Kilpatrick Stockton
LLP. The author's law firm participated as plaintiffs counsel in one of the cases referenced
in this article, Estateof MartinLuther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir.
1999).
1. 175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (providing for criminal penalties).
3. 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (1994) (providing for civil liability).
4. See Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1272; David Nimmer, The End of Copyright, 48 VAND.
L. REV. 1385, 1388 (1995); Susan M. Deas, Jazzing Up the Copyright Act? Resolving the
Uncertaintiesof the United States Anti-Bootlegging Law, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J.
567 (1998).
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ments Act in 1994, 5 was an effort to comply with the United States's
obligations under the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property.6 The legislative history of the Antibootlegging Statute-which is scant-indicates that Congress believed that it had
authority to enact the Statute under the Copyright Clause of the
Constitution.'
The Copyright Clause authorizes Congress "to promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their Respective Writings and Discoveries."' The term "Writings" has been interpreted broadly to encompass
works not traditionally reduced to paper,9 but only if such works are
"fixed" in some tangible form.' ° For example, in 1971 Congress granted
copyright protection to sound recordings." But this protection did not
apply to the unauthorized recording of live musical performances, which,
by their nature, are not "fixed" in a tangible form. 2
The Antibootlegging Statute ostensibly closed that loophole. Put
simply, the statute imposes civil liability upon persons who record (or
more properly, "fix") live musical performances without the consent of
the performers, or who reproduce, transmit, or distribute such recordings.' 3 If these acts are done "for purposes of commercial advantage or
private financial gain," the statute also provides for criminal penalties. 4
Ali Moghadam, convicted of violating the criminal provisions of the
Antibootlegging Statute, claimed that the statute was unconstitutional
because it violated the "fixation" requirement of the Copyright Clause.' 5
Declining to decide "whether the fixation concept of the Copyright Clause
can be expanded so as to encompass live performances that are merely
capable of being reduced to tangible form, but have not been," the

5. Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 513(a), 108 Stat. 4809, 4974-75 (1995), amended by No
Electronic Theft (NET) Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, § 2(e), 111 Stat. 2678, 2679 (1997).
6. See Nimmer, supra note 4, at 1389-93; Deas, supra note 4, at 582-91.
7. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1272 (citing 140 CONG. REC. H11441, H11457 (daily ed.
Nov. 29, 1994) (statement of Rep. Hughes)).

8.

U.S. CONsT. art I,

§ 8, cl. 8.

9. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1274; see also 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.08[B], at 1-66.25 to 1-66.26 (1999).
10. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1273-74; see also 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 9,
§ 1.08[C][2], at 1-66.30 to 1-66.34.
11. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1271 (citing Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92140, 85 Stat. 391 (1972) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7) (1994))).
12. Id. at 1272.
13. 17 U.S.C. § 1101(a).

14. 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(a).
15. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1274.
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Eleventh Circuit instead analyzed the case under the Commerce
Clause."1

Not surprisingly, the court found a sufficient connection between
bootleg recordings and interstate commerce to satisfy the requirements
of United States v. Lopez. 7 But the court did not stop there. The more
challenging-and interesting-question the court faced was whether
Congress could use its Commerce Clause power to avoid limitations that
the Copyright Clause would impose on the same legislation."8 More
specifically, could Congress avoid the fixation requirement of the
Copyright Clause by enacting the Antibootlegging Statute pursuant to
the Commerce Clause? 19
The court concluded that Congress could indeed avoid the fixation
requirement. ° In effect the court determined that the term "Writings"-and therefore the fixation requirement-in the Copyright Clause
is not an absolute limitation on Congress's power:
We hold that the Copyright Clause does not envision that Congress is
positively forbidden from extending copyright-like protection under
other constitutional clauses, such as the Commerce Clause, to works of
authorship that may not meet the fixation requirement inherent in the
term "Writings." The grant itself is stated in positive terms, and does
not imply any negative pregnant that suggests that the term "Writings" operates as a ceiling on Congress' ability to legislate pursuant to
other grants.21
Noting that extending "quasi-copyright protection to unfixed musical
performances is in no way inconsistent with the Copyright Clause" and
indeed "complements and is in harmony with" existing copyright
protections, the court concluded that the Antibootlegging Statute was
valid under the Commerce Clause.22
Yet, Moghadam is not likely to be the last constitutional challenge to
the Antibootlegging Statute. The Eleventh Circuit's holding is narrow-the only issue properly before the court was based on the fixation
requirement inherent in the term "Writings" of the Copyright Clause.2"
For one thing, as the court observed, the Copyright Clause also provides

16. Id.
17. Id. at 1275-77 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)).
18. Id. at 1277.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1281.
21. Id. at 1280.
22. Id. at 1280-82.
23. Id. at 1280, 1282 & n.17 (characterizing the court's holding as "narrow" and noting
that Moghadam waived other potential constitutional challenges to the statute).
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24
that Congress may grant copyright protection for "Limited Times."
It is difficult to imagine a court interpreting this provision, as the
Eleventh Circuit did with the "Writings" provision,25 to constitute
anything other than an express limitation on Congress's power.26
Although the court did not explore this issue, the rationale employed in
its opinion suggests that Congress could not use its powers under the
Commerce Clause to enact the Antibootlegging Statute, and it seems
likely that a court will sooner or later so decide. Otherwise, as one
commentator wondered, "[Is there any amendment to copyright law
[Congress] cannot make under the commerce banner?"27 Moreover,
future challengers may raise First Amendment issues because the
statute provides no affirmative defense for fair use.28 It thus seems
likely that courts will soon revisit questions regarding the constitutional
foundations of the Antibootlegging Statute.

II.

COPYRIGHT

A.

Copyright Licenses of Indefinite Duration
Copyright licenses executed after January 1, 1978 are governed by 17
U.S.C. § 203, which provides that "[tiermination of the grant may be
effected at any time during a period of five years beginning at the end
of thirty-five years from the date of execution."29 In Korman v. HBC
Florida, Inc.," the Eleventh Circuit considered whether that statute
creates a minimum thirty-five year duration for copyright licenses that
are otherwise silent as to duration or termination.31 This question

24. Id. at 1281.
25. Id. at 1280.
26. A recent decision by the District Court for the District of Columbia recognized that
Congress has discretion to define "Limited Times" and to extend the term of copyright
protection retrospectively. See Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3-4 (D.D.C. 1999). But
as that court observed, "Within the discretion of Congress, any fixed term is a limited time
because it is not perpetual. If a limited time is extended for a limited time then it remains
a limited time." Id. at 3 n.7.
27. 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 9, § 8E.01[C], at 8E-8.
28. See Nimmer, supra note 4, at 1400 & n.100 (observing that the legislative history
of the statute indicates that Congress did not intend the statute to apply "in cases where
First Amendment principles are implicated, such as ... in a news broadcast or for other
purposes of comment or criticism"); Deas, supra note 4, at 580.
29. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (1994).
30. 182 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 1999).
31. Id. at 1294.
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previously
resulted in a split between the Seventh Circuit and the Ninth
32
Circuit.

Over a period of seven years, Mimi Korman wrote several jingles for
a Florida radio station. With Korman's permission, the station used one
of these jingles as a station identifier.
Korman later ended her
relationship with the station and objected to the continued use of the
jingle by the station. Still later, she applied.for and received a copyright
registration for the jingle and again demanded that the station cease
using the jingle. When the station refused, she sued for copyright
infringement.33
The district court held that Korman had granted the station a
nonexclusive license to use the jingle. That court then concluded that
the provisions of 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) prevented Korman from terminating the license for a period of thirty-five years from the date on which it
was granted. Needless to say, Korman appealed. 3'
The Eleventh Circuit agreed that Korman had, in fact, granted an
implied license to the station. 5 It likewise agreed that 17 U.S.C. § 203
applied to the license. 36 However, the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with
the district court's conclusion that the statute mandates a minimum
term for copyright licenses of indefinite duration. 7
The court first observed that nothing in Section 203 prevents parties
from entering into license agreements that provide for termination in
less than thirty-five years.3" The more interesting question, the court
noted, was "whether section 203 imposes a 35-year term for a license of
indefinite duration that would otherwise be subject to earlier termination under state contract law."39 The Ninth Circuit concluded that it
does," and the Seventh Circuit concluded that it does not.41

32. Id. (citing Walthal v. Rusk, 172 F.3d 481, 484-85 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that
Section 203 does not create a minimum 35-year term); Rano v. Sipa Press, Inc., 987 F.2d
580, 585 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that Section 203 does create a minimum 35-year term)).
33. Id. at 1292.
34. Id. at 1292-93.
35. Id. at 1293.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1293-94.
38. Id. at 1295. The court observed that the legislative history of the Copyright Act
"clearly indicate[s] that section 203 was not intended to preclude or affect the duration of
licensing agreements made for terms of less than 35 years." Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 941476, at 128 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5743; S. REP. No. 94-473, at 111
(1975)).
39. Id.
40. Rano, 987 F.2d at 585.
41. Walthal, 172 F.3d at 484-85.
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The Eleventh Circuit concluded that both the plain language and the
legislative history of the statute favored the Seventh Circuit's approach.42 First, the court observed that the language of Section
203(a)(3) cannot be construed to impose a minimum duration unless the
word "only" is *read into the phrase "may be effected."4 3 The court
refused to adopt this interpretation, however, stating that Congress did
not include the word "only" in Section 203(a)(3) and that reading the
44
word into the section would change the provision's plain meaning.
Moreover, the court noted, if Congress meant to create a minimum
thirty-five year term for copyright licenses of indefinite duration, then
allowing parties to agree to shorter terms would seem inconsistent.4 5
Finally, the legislative history indicated that Congress intended Section
203 to benefit authors, "not publishers or broadcasters or others who
benefit from the work of authors."46 In the court's view, a minimum
thirty-five 47year term would defeat that congressional intent rather than
further it.
The court recognized, however, that Section 203(b)(6) could lend
support to the Ninth Circuit's contrary reading of Section 203(a)(3):
"Unless and until termination is effected under this section, the grant [of
a copyright license], if it does not provide otherwise, continues in effect
for the term of copyright provided by this title."4' Read together with
Section 203(a)(3), this section suggests that a license can be terminated
before thirty-five years only if a license agreement contains an express
provision to that effect.49 But the Eleventh Circuit reconciled these
sections, observing that state contract laws are read into license
agreements and "'provide otherwise' within the meaning of section
203(b)(6)."50 Accordingly, the court held that "if state law provides that
licenses of indefinite duration may be terminated in less than 35 years,
it is state law and not section 203 that governs the question of termination before 35 years. " "

42. 182 F.3d at 1295.
43. Id. at 1295-96.
44. Id. at 1296.
45. Id. (citing 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 9, § l1.01[B], at 11-8).
46. Id. (citing Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 172-73 & n.39 (1985)); see also
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 124 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5739; S. REP.
No. 94-473, at 108 (1975).

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

182 F.3d at 1296.
17 U.S.C. § 203(b)(6) (1994).
182 F.3d at 1296.
Id. at 1296-97.
Id. at 1297.
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General PublicationUnder the CopyrightAct of 1909

Another copyright case decided by the Eleventh Circuit during 1999,
Estate of Martin Luther King,53Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc.,5 2 received widespread publicity and attention.
During-the historic March on Washington on August 28, 1963, Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr. delivered the speech in which he uttered the
now-famous phrase, "I have a dream .... " The speech was broadcast
live by radio and television to millions of people. About one month later,
Dr. King registered audio and printed versions of the speech with the
Copyright Office and soon thereafter successfully sued to prevent the
sale of unauthorized recordings of the speech. 4 In subsequent years
Dr. King's Estate renewed the copyright and licensed it for use by third
parties.55
In 1994 CBS produced a video documentary episode that included film
footage of more than sixty percent of Dr. King's speech. However, CBS
did not seek authorization from Dr. King's Estate and refused to pay
royalties to the Estate. Consequently, the Estate sued CBS for copyright
infringement. CBS argued, among other things, that the presentation
of Dr. King's speech, combined with the unrestricted, simultaneous, and
widespread dissemination of the speech, constituted a general publication. This meant that the speech entered the public domain at the time
it was given and that Dr. King's subsequent attempt to obtain federal
copyright protection was invalid.5" The district court agreed and
granted summary judgment in favor of CBS.57
The Estate appealed and, in a two-to-one decision, the Eleventh
Circuit reversed.5" Judge Anderson and Judge Cook (a senior district

52.
53.

194 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 1999).
See, e.g., Bill Rankin, King's Speech: Who Owns Soul-Stirring Words, ATLANTA
CONST., May 12, 1999, at Al; Famous Footage; King Family Battles CBS in Court over
Rights to 'I Have a Dream' Speech, WINSTON-SALEM J., May 17, 1999, at BI; Michael I.
Rudell, The Public Domain: 'I Have a Dream,' 220 N.Y.L.J. 3 (1998); Rev. King's Heirs Win
Round in Appellate Court; Family Suing CBS Over Use of'I Have a Dream' Speech, CHI.
TRIB., Nov. 7, 1999, at 18; Appeals Court Reinstates Suit Over 'Dream' Speech, HOuS.
CHRON., Nov. 7, 1999, at A21; Kevin Sach, Appeals Panel Revives Suit on Use of Dr. King's
Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1999, at 20; Michael Dorman, In CBS v. King Family, A New
Hearing, NEWSDAY, Nov. 8, 1999, at A15.
54. See King v. Mister Maestro, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 101, 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
55. 194 F.3d at 1213.
56. See generally 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 9, §§ 4.01-4.13.
57. 194 F.3d at 1213-14.
58. Id.

1276

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

court judge sitting by designation) wrote separate opinions in which they
reached the same result, while Judge Roney dissented.
Judge Anderson began his opinion by noting that the case was
properly analyzed under the Copyright Act of 1909, as that was the law
in effect at the time in question.59 He then recognized that, under the
applicable law, general publication of a work divested an author of
common law copyright protection.' Unless the author had complied
with certain statutory formalities of the Copyright Act, the work entered
the public domain. 6'
Because the consequences of general publication were severe, he noted,
courts have deemed certain acts "limited publications" rather than
"general publications":
A general publication occurred when a work was made available to
members of the public at large without regard to their identity or what
they intend to do with the work. Conversely, a non-divesting limited
publication was one that communicated the contents of a work to a
select group and for a limited purpose, and without the right of
diffusion, reproduction, distribution or sale.62

Judge Anderson then began a relatively detailed examination of cases
supporting the general rule that the performance of a work does not
constitute a general publication. 3 In light of those cases, he concluded
that there were genuine issues of fact as to whether the presentation of
Dr. King's speech constituted a general publication." Accordingly, he
held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to
CBS. 5
In a separate opinion, Judge Cook concurred in the result reached by
In his view, however, the district court erred
Judge Anderson."
because its opinion was based solely on Dr. King's performance of the
speech. 7 As Judge Cook interpreted the law, performed works, such as
a speech, must be treated differently than nonperformed works. 6 The
principle under the common law and the 1909 Act recognizes that
"neither a general nor a limited publication can ever occur merely from

59. Id. at 1214.
60. Id.
61. Id.

62. Id. at 1214-15 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 1215-16.
Id. at 1217.
Id. at 1220.
Id. (Cook, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 1221.
Id.
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performance in the absence of an authorized distribution of a tangible
copy of the work without a copyright notice or a reservation of rights." 9
Because the district court did not rely on any evidence that Dr. King
disseminated tangible copies of the speech without a reservation of
rights,70 it erred in finding that a general publication occurred.7 '
Judge Cook's analysis seems the better reasoned of the two opinions.
Under the 1909 Act, authors generally obtained federal copyright
protection by publishing their work with a copyright notice. 2 Congress
created an exception, however, for certain "works not reproduced for
sale" such as lectures and dramatic or musical compositions.73 Authors
could obtain copyright protection for these works without publishing
them by depositing a copy of the work with the Copyright Office. 74 If
the work was "later reproduced in copies for sale," the Act required the
author to register the copyright as a published work. 75 "The interesting
point is that the language [in this section] in effect defined publication
as the reproduction of copies for sale. This idea was reinforced by the
provision that 'where the work is later reproduced in copies for sale' it
was to be registered as a published work."7" It seems, then, that
Congress acknowledged that the mere performance of such works did not
constitute publication. Moreover, as one commentator has observed, a
contrary rule would have imposed an unreasonable burden on authors
of these works:
[W]ith respect to ... television (and to a lesser extent, radio), the
volume of such performances and exigencies of time in connection with
the preparation of material therefor rendered the burden of prior
deposit almost insurmountable. At the other end of the dramatic
spectrum-the legitimate stage production-there are generally no
problems of volume or of limited time for preparation. Yet, here too a

69. Id. at 1222.
70. Although CBS presented evidence that advance copies of Dr. King's speech were
distributed to the press and that a copy of the speech was later printed in a Southern
Christian Leadership Conference newsletter, the district court noted that there were
material facts in dispute regarding these issues. Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc.
v. CBS, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1353 (N.D. Ga. 1998). The court therefore expressly
stated that it did "not rest its holding upon the newsletter or the advance text but-upon
the context of Dr. King's speech itself." Id. at 1353 n.5.
71. 194 F.3d at 1222-23 (Cook, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
72. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 9, 35 Stat. 1075, 1077 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. § 401(a) (1994)), reprinted in 8 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 9, at App. 6.
73. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 11, 35 Stat. 1075, 1078.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. L. Ray Patterson, Copyright Complexities; Dream Speech Litigation Illustrates
Tough Issues, ConflictingRights, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Mar. 23, 1999, at 7.
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prior deposit requirement would have proven most burdensome. The
practice of making numerous revisions in a play during the period of
public performance is well-known. To require a deposit in the
Copyright Office before permitting a revision to be performed in the
pre-Broadway runs or even thereafter would obviously seriously
hamper the development of a play."
Lectures and speeches certainly fall somewhere in the middle of this
spectrum. Indeed, the most famous portions of Dr. King's speech,
including the words "I have a dream," were extemporaneous and
therefore not included in the prepared text of the speech.78 In light of
these principles, it seems that Judge Cook was correct in recognizing the
unique nature of performed works and the principle that performance
alone does not constitute publication.
III.

LANHAM ACT

The Eleventh Circuit decided at least three cases involving Lanham
Act 79 claims that deserve comment.
A. Tademark Infringement: A StraightforwardApplication of the
Likelihood-of-Confusion Analysis
Section 32(1) of the Lanham Act grants the owner of a federally
registered trademark the right to bring a civil action against a junior
user of a mark that "is likely to cause confusion" with the registrant's
mark. 0 In determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion,
courts in the Eleventh Circuit consider essentially the same factors
considered by courts throughout the country.8 ' These include: (1) the
strength of the plaintiff's mark, (2) the similarity of the parties' marks,
(3) the similarity of the products or services on or in connection with
which the marks are used, (4) the similarity of the parties' trade
channels and customers, (5) the similarity of advertising media, (6) the

77. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 9, § 4.08[B], at 4-46 to 4-47 (footnotes omitted).
78. See King, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 1348 (observing that "[the Estate points out that the
advance text differed significantly from the speech as actually delivered" and that the
"speech itself contained 682 words not included in the advance text").
79. Trademark Act of 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (1947) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1127 (West 1997 & Supp. 2000)). The Act is commonly known as the
Lanham Act.
80. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1114(1).
81. While the factors applied by the Eleventh Circuit are similar to those applied in
other circuits, they are not necessarily identical. See 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY
ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 24:30 to 24:43 (4th ed. 2000) (describing the
factors applied in each circuit).
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defendant's intent in adopting its mark (e.g., good faith), and (7) the
existence of any actual confusion. 2
In FrehlingEnterprises,Inc. v. InternationalSelect Group, Inc.,83 the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court misapplied nearly all
of these factors in finding that defendant's BELL' OGGETTI mark, used
for ready-to-assemble furniture, did not infringe plaintiff's OGGETTI
mark, used for high-end furniture and decorative accessories.8" The
Eleventh Circuit's opinion is unusual in two respects. First, the court
took the rare, though not unheard of, step of finding infringement as a
matter of law. 5 Second, the court independently analyzed nearly all
the factors listed above; s" most appellate decisions focus on fewer
factors. Therefore, Frehling serves as an unusually thorough and
straightforward example of the likelihood-of-confusion analysis.
B.

Priorityand the Natural Expansion Doctrine

Unfortunately, the court's opinion was less straightforward and
thorough in Carnival Brand Seafood Co. v. Carnival Brands, Inc. 7
The court undoubtedly reached the right result, but only after an
unnecessary analysis of the case under the natural expansion doctrine.'3
1. Related Goods and the Natural Expansion Doctrine.
It is
generally accepted that a trademark owner's rights may extend beyond
the specific goods or services for which the mark is used to cover related
goods or services.8 9 "Thus, an owner of a ... trademark may use its

82. See Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Longhorn Steaks, Inc., 122 F.3d 1379,
1382 (11th Cir. 1997). See generally Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Likelihood of Confusion
Determinations: A Survey of Eleventh Circuit Jurisprudence, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 57
(1994) (explaining the likelihood-of-confusion doctrine).
83. 192 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 1999).
84. Id. at 1342.

85. Id.
86. Id.
87. 187 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 1999).
88. There are actually two different doctrines in trademark law sometimes referred to
by this term. One natural expansion doctrine concerns the territorial extent of commonlaw trademark rights. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 81, § 26:20, at 26-31 to 26-33. The
other natural expansion doctrine-and the one at issue in Carnival-concernsa trademark
owner's right to expand its use of the mark to other related goods. See id. § 24:20, at 24-38
to 24-39.
89. See id. § 24:6, at 24-13 ("The modern rule of law gives the trademark owner
protection against use of its mark on any product or service which would reasonably be
thought by the buying public to come from the same source, or thought to be affiliated
with, connected with, or sponsored by, the trademark owner.").
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mark on related products or services and may enjoin a junior user's use
of the mark on such related uses."' But the right to use one's trademark on related goods is not without limitation:
"[A] trademark owner cannot by the normal expansion of its business
extend the use or registration of its mark to distinctly different goods
or services not comprehended by its previous use ... where the result
could be a conflict with valuable intervening rights established by
another through extensive use ... of the same or similar mark for like
or similar goods and services."
The natural expansion doctrine purports to keep this from happening.
Essentially, the doctrine posits that the first trademark owner has
priority-that is, superior rights--over subsequent users, but only with
respect to goods on which the mark has either already been used or that
lie within the realm of natural expansion.92 If the related goods are not
within the first user's realm of natural expansion, the subsequent user
has priority with respect to those goods. 3
Related goods are deemed to be within the first user's realm of natural
expansion if, at the time the subsequent user began using its mark,
consumers would have assumed that the goods or services of both parties
4
originated from the same source or were in some way affiliated.9 The
doctrine thus requires courts to apply the likelihood of confusion
factors 95 retrospectively, focusing not on the present-day situation, but
rather on the time of the subsequent user's entry into the market. 9,
A finding that confusion is likely does not, however, give the first user
the right to enjoin the subsequent user; it merely establishes that the
first user's priority extends to the related goods. 97 Thus, to prevail in
an infringement action against an intervening user, the first user must
prove likelihood of confusion twice-once to establish that it has priority

90. Carnival, 187 F.3d at 1310.
91. Id. at 1310-11 (quoting American Stock Exchange, Inc. v. American Express Co.,
207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 356, 364 (T.T.A.B. 1980)).
92. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 81, § 24:20, at 24-38 to 24-39.
93. See id. § 24:20, at 24-39. "[Tihe rule has been limited by a recognition that a senior
user cannot by expansion prevail where the result would be a likelihood of confusion in

derogation of established rights of the intervening user." Id. In such cases it follows that
the intervening user would be deemed to have priority with respect to its goods.
94. Carnival,187 F.3d at 1311; see also 4 McCARTHY, supra note 81, § 24:20, at 24-39.
95. See supra text accompanying note 82.
96. Carnival,187 F.3d at 1311-12; see also 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 81, § 24:20, at 2439 ("What is or is not a 'natural expansion' in fact is apparently determined by the

perception of customers at the time of the junior user's first use of mark A on product line
Z.C).

97. Carnival, 187 F.3d at 1311 n.4.
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with respect to the related goods, and again to establish that the present
use of both parties' marks is likely to create confusion as to the
affiliation or sponsorship of those goods.9"
As discussed below, the natural expansion doctrine is confusing and
unnecessary. Unfortunately, that did not stop the Eleventh Circuit from
applying the doctrine in Carnival.
2. Application of the Natural Expansion Doctrine in Carni.
val. In 1980 Mariscos de Bahia, S.A., a Honduran company, began
using the CARNIVAL trademark in connection with the sale of raw
shrimp. In 1990 Carnival Brands, Inc. ("CBI") began using the
CARNIVAL trademark in connection with the sale of chicken gumbo and
seafood gumbo. In 1992 CBI expanded the line of products it sold under
the CARNIVAL mark to include other precooked seafood products."
In 1996 Mariscos assigned all of its rights in the CARNIVAL mark to
Carnival Brand Seafood Company ("CBSC"), which continued to sell raw
shrimp and, later that year, began selling other seafood entrees under
the CARNIVAL mark. 1°° In 1997 CBSC sued CBI, alleging trademark
infringement. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
CBI, concluding as a matter of law that there was no likelihood of
confusion between the two marks.1"'
The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's decision.1 2 The
court correctly observed that "Mariscos was unquestionably the senior
user with respect to raw shrimp."10 ' The court also correctly concluded
that CBSC stood in the shoes of Mariscos for purposes of determining
priority.'" The court might well have moved on to determine whether
the parties' present-day use of their marks created a likelihood of
confusion. Instead, the court attempted to determine whether CBSC had
priority with respect to the related goods-namely, the seafood gumbo,
chicken gumbo, and other seafood products sold under the CBI
mark. 105 Applying the natural expansion doctrine, the court concluded

98. Id.
99. Id. at 1308-09.
100. CBSC also received an assignment from another company using the CARNIVAL!
mark. Id. at 1309. The court in Carnival also addressed issues regarding CBSC's rights
pursuant to that assignment. Id. at 1315-16. However, this Article will not discuss those
issues because the most noteworthy aspects of the decision concern CBSC's rights pursuant

to the Mariscos assignment.
101. Id. at 1308-09.
102. Id. at 1316.
103. Id. at 1310.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1311-15.
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that there were genuine issues as to whether, at the time CBI began
using its marks, consumers would have assumed that Mariscos's raw
shrimp and CBI's seafood products came from the same source or that
the sources were somehow affiliated.' °6 Accordingly, the Eleventh
Circuit held that. the district court erred in effectively finding no
infringement
as a matter of law by granting summary judgment to
10 7
CBI.

3. An Unnecessarily Complicated and Misleading Analysis. In
explaining the natural expansion doctrine, the Eleventh Circuit quoted
Professor McCarthy's treatise, but seemingly missed his point:
"[Tihe 'natural expansion' thesis seems to be nothing more than an
unnecessarily complicated application of the likelihood of confusion of
source or sponsorship test to a particular factual situation. If the
'intervening' use was likely to cause confusion, it was an infringement,
and the senior user has the right to enjoin such use, whether it had in
fact already expanded itself or not.""'
Specifically, the natural expansion doctrine is unnecessary because the
ordinary likelihood-of-confusion analysis and the affirmative defense of
laches'1 9 (and, in appropriate cases, acquiescence) serve to prevent the
same harm that the natural expansion doctrine seeks to prevent. The
doctrine is also misleading because it confuses the concept of priority
with the scope of protection to which a mark is entitled.
It is beyond dispute that trademark rights are acquired by using a
mark in commerce." 0 A prior user enjoys superior rights over a
subsequent user,"' including the right to enjoin any subsequent user
whose mark creates a likelihood of confusion." 2 This is true even if

106. Id. at 1315-16.
107. Id. at 1316.
108. Id. at 1311 (quoting 4 McCARTHY, supra note 81, § 24:20, at 24-39 (emphasis
added)).
109. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 81, § 24:20, at 24-41 (recognizing that "laches is the
obvious rebuttal to a tardy assertion of rights").
110.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 18 (1995) ("Rights can be

acquired in a designation only when the designation has actually been used as a trademark
... or when an applicable statutory provision recognizes a protectable interest in the

designation prior to actual use. A designation is "used" as a trademark ... when the
designation is displayed or otherwise made known to prospective purchasers in the
ordinary course of business in a manner that associates the designation with the goods,
services, or business of the user .... ").
111. See id. § 19; 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 81, § 16:4, at 16-5.
112. See 2 McCARTHY, supra note 81, § 16:4, at 16-5 ("[Tlhe first to use a designation

as a mark in the sale of goods or services is the.

.

. 'senior user.' These marks are given
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the parties use their marks on different goods.11 To establish infringement, trademark owners are not required to establish that both
marks are used on identical goods.'14 Indeed, one of the factors courts
consider in determining whether confusion is likely is the similarity of
the parties' goods, which presupposes that a trademark owner's rights
can extend to goods on which the mark has not been used." 5 Of
course, the degree of similarity necessary to find infringement may
depend on the various other likelihood-of-confusion factors." 6 The
stronger the first user's mark, for example, the less similar the parties'
goods may need to be." 7
Thus, there is no need to apply a separate, retrospective likelihood-ofconfusion analysis to determine the extent of the first user's priority.
Whichever party used the mark first has priority."' The next question
should be whether, given both parties' use of their marks, confusion is
likely today. This, of course, involves assessing the similarity of the
parties' goods. For this purpose alone, the court should look back in
time-an intervening user's goods are properly compared to the senior
user's goods at the time the junior user entered the market. However,
this does not involve redefining the senior user's priority; it simply
recognizes the proper scope of protection to which the senior user's mark
is entitled.
Moreover, it seems likely that in nearly every case involving an
intervening use, the junior user will have a laches defense. Thus, even
if the senior user establishes that confusion is likely, the senior user may
find itself estopped from enjoining the junior user if the senior user sat
on its rights and knowingly allowed the junior user to build goodwill in
its mark before bringing the infringement action." 9 Likewise, although less common, if the senior user indicated through some affirma-

legal protection against infringement immediately upon adoption and use in trade ...
113. See supra note 89.
114. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 81, § 24:2, at 24-7 (discussing the historical

development of the modern rule).
115. See, e.g., Carnival, 187 F.3d at 1311.
116. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 81, § 23:20.1, at 23-55 ("The degree of similarity of
the marks needed to prove likely confusion will vary with the difference in the goods and
services of the parties.").
117. See Davis, supra note 82, at 105-06 ("A mark or trade dress deemed to be strong
can slice across wide gulfs in goods or services to secure protection against infringing uses
for its owner."); see, e.g., Chemical Corp. of Am. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433, 434
(5th Cir. 1962) (deeming the WHERE THERE'S LIFE... THERE'S BUGS mark, used for
combination insecticide and floor wax, to infringe the WHERE THERE'S LIFE ...
THERE'S BUD mark, used for beer).
118. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
119. See 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 81, § 31:1, at 31-8.
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tive act that it did not object to the intervening use, the junior user may
also assert the defense of acquiescence.' 2° This would also estop the
senior user from enjoining the otherwise infringing use. 121 Together,
the ordinary likelihood-of-confusion analysis and the affirmative defenses
of laches and acquiescence thus accomplish the same purpose as the
natural expansion doctrine.
Thus, in Carnivalthe Eleventh Circuit should have ended its analysis
of CBSC's priority with the observation that "Mariscos [and, by virtue
of the assignment, CBSC] was unquestionably the senior user with
respect to raw shrimp."122 The next question should have been
whether, as a matter of law, confusion was unlikely. In addition to the
other likelihood-of-confusion factors, this analysis should have involved
assessing the similarity of the parties' goods-CBSC's raw shrimp and
CBI's seafood gumbo, chicken gumbo, and other seafood products. It is
difficult to imagine how this factor could not present a genuine issue of
fact considering previous decisions in this jurisdiction holding there to
be confusion between similar marks used for wine and brandy,"2 food
and gin, 24 whiskey and cigars, 2 ' bus transportation and sightseeing
tours, 2"' 6 golf courses and golf associations,' 27 and shrimp processing
services and processed shrimp. 2 The Eleventh Circuit, then, should
have vacated the district court's decision on the ground that there were
genuine issues of fact regarding the similarity of the parties' goods, a
significant factor in the likelihood-of-confusion analysis.
C. Cancellation of RegistrationsFor Functionality
In Wilhelm Pudenz, GmbH v. Littlefuse, Inc.,29 the Eleventh Circuit
held that a "trademark registration that has achieved incontestable
status ...

is still subject to attack based on functionality."3 9

120. See SunAmerica Corp. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 77 F.3d 1325, 1334 (11th
Cir. 1996); 5 McCARTHY, supra note 81, §§ 31:41 to 31:42, at 31-79 to 31-84.
121. See SunAmerica Corp., 77 F.3d at 1334.
122. 187 F.3d at 1310.
123. E. Remy Martin & Co. v. Shaw-Ross Intl Imports, Inc., 756 F.2d 1525, 1530 (11th
Cir. 1985).
124. Beef/Eater Restaurants, Inc. v. James Burrough, Ltd., 398 F.2d 637, 639 (5th Cir.

1968).
125.

Tampa Cigar Co. v. John Walker & Sons, Ltd., 222 F.2d 460, 461 (5th Cir. 1955).

126.

Greyhound Corp. v. Goberna, 128 F.2d 806, 807 (5th Cir. 1942).

127.

Professional Golfer's Ass'n v. Banker's Life & Cas. Co., 514 F.2d 665, 670 (5th Cir.

1975).

128. Conagra, Inc. v. Singleton, 743 F.2d 1508, 1514 (11th Cir. 1984).
129. 177 F.3d 1204 (11th Cir. 1999).
130. Id. at 1211-12.
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1. Incontestability, Cancellation of Five-Year-Old Marks, Trade
Dress, and Functionality. Section 15 of the Lanham Act permits
owners of marks that have been registered and used for at least five
years to apply for incontestable status, provided certain statutory
requirements are met. 131 Subject to several defenses enumerated in
Section 33(b) of the Lanham Act, incontestable status constitutes
"conclusive evidence of the validity of the... registrant's exclusive right
to use the registered mark in commerce."'32 Attaining such status is,

131. This section provides:
Except on a ground for which application to cancel may be filed at any time
under paragraphs (3) and (5) of section 1064 of this title, and except to the extent,
if any, to which the use of a mark registered on the principal register infringes a
valid right acquired... prior to the date of registration under this chapter of such
registered mark, the right of the registrant to use such registered mark in
commerce for the goods or services on or in connection with which such registered
mark has been in continuous use for five consecutive years subsequent to the date
of such registration and is still in use in commerce, shall be incontestable:
Provided, That(1) there has been no final decision adverse to registrant's claim of ownership
of such mark for such goods or services, or to registrant's right to register the
same or to keep the same on the register; and
(2) there is no proceeding involving said rights pending in the Patent and
Trademark Office or in a court and not finally disposed of; and
(3) an affidavit is filed with the Commissioner within one year after the
expiration of any such five-year period setting forth those goods or services stated
in the registration on or in connection with which such mark has been in
continuous use for such five consecutive years and is still in use in commerce, and
other matters specified in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this section; and
(4) no incontestable right shall be acquired in a mark which is the generic name
for the goods or services or a portion thereof, for which it is registered.
15 U.S.C.A. § 1065.
132. Id. § 1115(b). At the time Pudenz filed suit, the enumerated defenses included:
(1) That the registration or the incontestable right to use the mark was obtained
fraudulently; or
(2) That the mark has been abandoned by the registrant; or
(3) That the registered mark is being used by or with the permission of the
registrant or a person in privity with the registrant, so as to misrepresent the
source of the goods or services on or in connection with which the mark is used;
or
(4) That the use of the name, term, or device charged to be an infringement is
a use, otherwise than as a mark, of the party's individual name in his own
business, or of the individual name of anyone in privity with such party, or of a
term or device which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to
describe the goods or services of such party, or their geographic origin; or
(5) That the mark whose use by a party is charged as an infringement was
adopted without knowledge of the registrant's prior use of has been continuously
used by such party or those in privity with him from a date prior to (A) the date
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therefore, quite valuable in the event of any future infringement
proceedings.
Section 14 of the Lanham Act limits the grounds upon which any
registration can be canceled after five years.' . These enumerated
grounds are not identical to the defenses enumerated in Section
33(b).'
Moreover, Section 14(3) applies to any mark that has been
registered for five years or more regardless of whether the registration
has attained incontestable status under Section 15.1"5 For this reason
Section 14(3) has been compared to a statute of limitations. 3 '
These provisions of the Lanham Act apply not only to registrations of
trademarks and service marks, but also to registrations for trade
dress." 7 Unlike trademarks and service marks, which typically consist
of words, design elements, or both, trade dress generally refers to "the

of constructive use of the mark established pursuant to section 1057(c) of this title,
(B) the registration of the mark under this chapter if the application for

registration is filed before the effective date of the Trademark Law Revision Act
of 1988, or (C) publication of the registered mark under subsection (c) of section
1062 of this title: Provided,however, That this defense or defect shall apply only
for the area in which such continuous prior use is proved; or
(6) That the mark whose use is charged as an infringement was registered and
used prior to the registration under this chapter or publication under subsection
(c) of section 1062 of this title of the registered mark of the registrant, and not
abandoned: Provided,however, That this defense or defect shall apply only for the
area in which the mark was used prior to such registration or such publication of
the registrant's mark; or
(7) That the mark has been or is being used to violate the antitrust laws of the
United States.
Id.
133. Id. § 1064. At the time Pudenz filed suit, this statute provided that a petition to
cancel a registration could be filed at any time
if the registered mark becomes the generic name for the goods or services, or a
portion thereof, for which it is registered, or has been abandoned, or its
registration was obtained fraudulently or contrary to the provisions of section 1054
of this title or of subsection (a), (b) or (c) or section 1052 of this title for a
registration under this chapter, or contrary to similar prohibitory provisions of
such prior Acts for a registration under such Acts, or if the registered mark is
being used by, or with the permission of, the registrant so as to misrepresent the
source of the goods or services on or in connection with which the mark is used.
Id.
134. Compare id. § 1115(b), with id. § 1064.
135. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 81, § 20:55, at 20-97 ("Once a registration is over five
years old, the grounds for cancellation are restricted under § 14 regardless of whether § 15
incontestable status has been invoked.").
136. Id.
137. See generally 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 81, § 8:7, at 8-25.
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38
overall image used to present a product or service to purchasers"1
and "can include such characteristics of a good as its size, shape, and
color."' 39
However, trade dress rights cannot be acquired in any feature that "is
essential to the use or purpose of the article or... [that] affects the cost
or quality of the article." 4' This principle, known as functionality, is
rooted in the notion that free market competition is good for society.'4 '
Although functional features can be protected by acquiring utility
patents, patents have a limited duration; competitors will eventually be
free to copy the useful feature protected by the patent, and society will
benefit from the new competition. 14 2 Unlike patent rights, trademark
and trade dress rights can be perpetual.'" Thus, if parties were
allowed to obtain perpetual trade dress rights in functional features,
society might forever miss the benefit of allowing competitors to copy
those useful features.'"
Significantly, however, the functionality doctrine was not mentioned
in the text of the Lanham Act until 1998.' 45 The 1998 amendments,
146
enacted as part of the Trademark Law Treaty Implementation Act
added functionality to the list of enumerated grounds upon which fiveyear-old registrations can be canceled under Section 14.147
The
amendments also added functionality to the list of Section 33(b) defenses
that can be asserted against incontestable registrations.'"

2. Pudenz v. Littlefuse, Inc.: Five-Year-Old Trade Dress
Registrations Can Be Canceled for Functionality. Littlefuse, a
manufacturer of automobile blade fuses, owned two incontestable
registrations covering the two-dimensional and three-dimensional
outlines of one of its fuses. Littlefuse objected when Pudenz later began
marketing similar fuses in the United States. Pudenz filed suit seeking
a declaratory judgment that its fuses did not infringe the Littlefuse

138. Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Of"Ugly Stiks" and Uglier Case Law: A Comment on the

Federal Registration of Functional Designs After Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of
America, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1257, 1265 (1994).
139. Id. at 1265-66. See generally 1 McCARTHY, supra note 81, §§ 8:1 to 8:21
(discussing the basic rules and defenses of trade dress protection).
140. Davis, supra note 138, at 1267.
141. Id. at 1267-68.
142. Pudenz, 177 F.3d at 1207-08.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1208.
146. Pub. L. No. 105-330, § 201(a)(4), 112 Stat. 3064, 3070 (1998).
147. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1064(3).
148. Id. § 1115(b).
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trade dress. Littlefuse counterclaimed, alleging that the Pudenz fuses
were infringing. Pudenz defended the infringement action under Section
33 of the Lanham Act and attacked the registrations themselves under
Section 14 on the ground that the registrations were functional. The
district court agreed that the features that the registrations sought to
protect 14were
functional and therefore held the registrations to be
9
invalid.

On appeal Littlefuse argued that its registrations could not be
canceled for functionality because they had attained incontestable
status. 5 ° In making this argument, Littlefuse relied on the Fourth
Circuit's decision in Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of America. 5 '
There, the Fourth Circuit interpreted the Supreme Court's holding in
Park 'N Fly v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc.'52 to mean that incontestable
registrations can be canceled only for the reasons enumerated in Section
14(3) of the Lanham Act."5 Littlefuse argued that because functionality was not one of the defenses enumerated in Section 33(b)of the
Lanham Act at the time Pudenz filed suit, Littlefuse's registrations could
not be canceled on that ground under Section 14(3) of the Act. In
addition, Littlefuse argued that the 1998 amendments that added
functionality to Section 14 were not effective until October 1998. This,
Littlefuse maintained, indicated that functionality was not an available
defense against registrations that became incontestable before that
time.' 4
The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis by recognizing that the
Supreme Court's decision in Park 'NFly was narrower than the Fourth
Circuit's decision in Shakespeare.'55 In Park 'N Fly the Supreme Court
held that an incontestable registration cannot "be defended against on
the ground that it is merely descriptive." 5 " In reaching that holding,
the Supreme Court relied on the fact that "mere descriptiveness" is not
listed in Section 33(b) of the Lanham Act.'
In Shakespeare the
Fourth Circuit applied this rationale to Section 14(3), holding that
registrations more than five years old may not be canceled on grounds
not specifically listed in Section 14(3)."' The Eleventh Circuit ob-

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

177 F.3d at 1206-07.
Id. at 1209.
9 F.3d 1091 (4th Cir. 1993).
469 U.S. 189 (1985).
9 F.3d at 1097.
177 F.3d at 1209-10.
Id. at 1209.

156. 469 U.S. at 205.
157. Id.

158. 9 F.3d at 1097.

20001

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

1289

served, however, that the Supreme Court did not decide in Park 'N Fly
whether other defenses not then enumerated in Section 33(b) (such as
laches) would likewise be unavailable.' 59 Thus, in declaring that
Section 14(3) lists the exclusive grounds for cancellation of five-year-old
marks, the Fourth Circuit actually went beyond the Supreme Court's
rationale in Park 'N Fly."6
Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit distinguished the issue presented in
Park 'N Fly from the issue presented in both Shakespeare and Pudenz. '' Unlike functionality, "mere descriptiveness" was mentioned
elsewhere in the Lanham Act, and the legislative history of the Act
demonstrates that Congress specifically intended to eliminate it as a
defense under Section 33(b).'62 In contrast, functionality was a
judicially created concept that predated the Lanham Act, and nothing in
the Act's legislative history indicates that Congress meant to abolish the
doctrine."a
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit addressed Littlefuse's argument that
functionality could not be applied to registrations that became incontestable before the effective date of the amendments adding functionality to
the Lanham Act.' 6' The court dismissed this argument, noting that
Congress characterized the amendments as "technical corrections," which
suggested that they were merely "meant to clarify existing law.""6 5
Likewise, the court quoted provisions from the legislative history of the
amendments suggesting that Congress specifically intended to "correct
the flawed result reached by the Fourth Circuit in Shakespeare."" In
light of these reasons, the court had little problem concluding that
registrations that achieved incontestable status before October 1998 can
nevertheless be canceled on the ground that they are functional.6 7
It is interesting that the court chose to support its holding, which
applies only to the Section 14(3) grounds for canceling marks registered
five or more years, with rationale dealing largely with the Section 33(b)
defenses to an incontestable registration. This was, of course, the

159. 177 F.3d at 1209 &n.4. Congress added the defense of laches to the list of Section
33(b) defenses in 1988. See Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667,

§ 128(b)(6), 102 Stat. 3935, 3945 (1990).
160. 177 F.3d at 1209.
161. Id. at 1210.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1210-11.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1211.
167. Id. at 1211-12.
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approach taken by the Fourth Circuit in Shakespeare."6 But was it
necessary to analogize these sections? Perhaps not. The fact that the
Littlefuse registrations had achieved incontestable status was irrelevant
to the issue before the court--namely, whether the Littlefuse registrations were subject to attack and cancellation under Section 14(3).
Section 33(b) provides that "[t]o the extent that the right to use the
registered mark has become incontestable under section 1065 ... the
registration . .. shall be subject to the following defenses." 169 Section

15, in turn, provides that "[elxcept on a ground for which an application
to cancel may be filed at any time under paragraph[] (3) ... of section
1064 ...

the right of the registrant ...

shall be incontestable."170

Read together, these sections indicate that the grounds enumerated in
Section 14(3) for attacking registrations apply regardless of a registration's incontestable status. Thus, it seems that the court could have
framed the issue without regard to Section 33(b). Based upon the
history of the functionality doctrine'17 and the legislative history of the
Trademark Law Treaty Implementation Act,'72 the court should have
had no problem concluding that functionality was available under
Section 14(3) to attack and cancel registrations more than five years old.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Of the decisions surveyed in this Article, only Carnival seems to have
been wrongly decided, and even there the court reached the right result,
though for the wrong reasons. Moghadam may prove to be the most
significant because the court's rationale suggests that the Antibootlegging Statute may not survive an attack based on the "Limited Times"
provision of the Copyright Clause, and any future decision to the
contrary would leave the true Copyright Clause limitation provisions
meaningless. Though the Eleventh Circuit may not necessarily be the
first court to reach that issue, it seems virtually certain that the court
will have no shortage of intellectual property issues to deal with in
coming years.

168.

See 9 F.3d at 1097.

169. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1115(b).
170. Id. § 1065.
171.
172.

See Pudenz, 177 F.2d at 1210.
See id. at 1211.

